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THE SCINTILLATION OF THE EVENT: ON 
BADIOU’S PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Ger t-Jan van der  Heiden (Radboud University Nijmegen) 
 
In Le Sens du monde, Nancy argues that “some value of scintillating 
phenomenality remains invincibly attached”  to Badiou’s notion of the 
event. This paper examines to what extent Nancy’s comments still apply 
to Badiou’s phenomenology of the event developed in Logiques des 
mondes. In particular, although Badiou provides a thorough account of 
the event from the perspective of the consequences it enables, I show on 
the basis of Nancy’s suggestion that he tends to neglect an account of 
the event from the perspective of its occurrence and its passage.    
 
In Le Sens du monde, Jean-Luc Nancy notes that the question of the 
event is a crucial one in contemporary French thought. Although Nancy 
discerns a definite similarity between his own account of the event and 
the way other (French) philosophers, such as Jean-Luc Marion, address 
the event, he is at the same time concerned about the particular phe-
nomenality they use to describe this notion. As Nancy writes, “some 
value of scintillating phenomenality remains invincibly attached” to 
these conceptions of the event. (SdM 35/18)1 He explains in an accom-
panying footnote that he reckons Alain Badiou among those philosophers 
that relate the notion of the event to its scintillation (éclat). To demon-
strate this he quotes a passage from the latter’s reading of Beckett’s Ill 
Seen, Ill Said, where Badiou writes, “The break in being that the sudden-
ness of the event crystallises, the brilliance of that which is held in poor 
esteem.” (C 351)2
                                                   
1 Jean-Luc Nancy, Le Sens du monde (hereafter referred to as SdM) (Paris: Galilée, 
1993). Translations are taken from Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, tr. J.S. 
Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). All parenthetical references 
refer to the original (French) editions followed by a reference to the English translation in 
case a quotation from these translations is included in the main text. 
2 Alain Badiou, Conditions (Paris: Seuil, 1992). (Hereafter referred to as C.) The 
translation is taken from Nancy, The Sense of the World, 176; the original French text 
reads as: “la brèche dans l’être que cristallise la soudaineté de l’événement, la brillance 
du mal vu.” 
 For Badiouan standards, the phrase “the brilliance of 
that which is held in poor esteem” is rather informal, and it is not until 
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Logiques des mondes that Badiou provides us with a thorough, formal 
description of the phenomenology of the event. In the conclusion to this 
monumental book, one can find at least one indication that Nancy’s re-
marks from 1993 concerning the brilliance of the event are still relevant 
for a reading of this work: Badiou uses the same term as Nancy—éclat or 
scintillation—to describe what happens in the event he calls the inexist-
ent. (LM 529)3
With his comments, Nancy proposes to read Badiou’s account of the 
event from the perspective of the problem of presence and appearance. 
To give an adequate account of the role played by presence and appear-
ance in Badiou’s thought, it is crucial to understand how he deals with 
appearance and presence in his account of subtraction in L’être et 
l’événement.
  
This paper examines the implications of Nancy’s brief remarks 
from 1993 for Badiou’s phenomenology developed in Logiques des 
mondes. In particular, it shows that Badiou’s phenomenology of the 
event provides us with an analysis of the event from the perspective of its 
consequences while neglecting an analysis of the event from the perspec-
tive of the event’s occurrence.  
 
1. Poetics versus Mathematics 
 
4
Badiou approaches the difference between his and Heidegger’s 
thought as the difference between a mathematical and a poetic treatment 
of the question of being. Throughout his work, Badiou criticises Heideg-
ger’s poetic treatment, and he does so from a number of different per-
 In particular, I want to turn briefly to Badiou’s reading of 
Martin Heidegger. Heidegger is important here not only because he is 
one of the main targets in Badiou’s account of subtraction, which can 
therefore be called anti-Heideggerian, but also because Nancy’s account 
of presence, appearance, and scintillation is highly indebted to Heideg-
ger.  
                                                   
3 Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes: L’être et l’événement 2 (LM) (Paris: Seuil, 2006). 
4 Alain Badiou, L’être et l’événement (Paris: Seuil, 1988). (Hereafter referred to as EE.) 
Translations taken from Alain Badiou, Being and Event, tr. O. Feltham (London: Contin-
uum, 2005). 
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spectives.5
At this point, where evidence is promoted over presence, it is not 
difficult to reconstruct a possible Heideggerian response. As opposed to 
Badiou’s claim that evidence is subtracted from presence, one could ar-
gue in a more Heideggerian fashion that mathematical evidence invokes 
an evidentia, that is, a particular phenomenality and a particular presenta-
tion. On the basis of Heidegger’s comments in Zur Sache des Denkens, 
one may conclude that for him, the real difference is not a difference be-
tween evidence and presence, but between, on the one hand, the light of 
energeia and evidentia (which Heidegger uses in a rhetorical context 
 These different perspectives are all carried by one fundamen-
tal question: How to conceive of ontology? 
This ontological difference between Heidegger and Badiou can 
clearly be discerned in their understanding of the real contribution of the 
Greek beginning of philosophy to the question of being. For Heidegger, 
the reinterpretation of the Greek notion of truth—aletheia—as uncon-
cealment guides his approach to the question of being and constitutes the 
Greek experience of thought. For Badiou, however, the event of Greek 
thought cannot consist in the invention of a poetic “coming-forth of be-
ing” or unconcealment since the conception of such a non-latency was al-
ready part of other and older cultures. (EE 143–4) As an alternative to 
Heidegger’s account of the Greek beginning of philosophy, Badiou in-
sists that “[t]he particular invention of the Greeks is that being is ex-
pressible once a decision of thought subtracts it from any instance of 
presence.” (EE 144/126; my emphasis) Badiou continues, “The Greeks 
did not invent the poem. Rather they interrupted the poem with the 
matheme.” These comments paint a clear picture of the difference be-
tween poetry and mathematics as models for ontology: this difference 
concerns the relation between ontology and phenomenology. In Heideg-
ger’s poetic approach, being coincides with the occurrence of coming-
forth and coming into presence. (EE 141/123) In Badiou’s mathematical 
approach, being is subtracted from presence and appearing. This ap-
proach “disjoins being from appearing, essence from existence.” (EE 
143/125) Already in Greek thought, this subtraction opened up the possi-
bility to approach being from the perspective of (mathematical) evidence 
rather than (poetic) presencing. (EE 143)  
                                                   
5 Alain Badiou, Manifeste pour la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1989), 41–58; and Alain 
Badiou, “Metaphysics and the Critique of Metaphysics” in Pli, 10, 2000, 181.  
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rather than a mathematical one) and, on the other hand, Lichtung as the 
realm of openness that precedes the light of evidentia.6
This Heideggerian difference also shows the complexity and am-
biguity of Heidegger’s account of truth; it shows that his interpretation of 
truth is not only a matter of presentation but also an inquiry into that 
which is earlier than and presupposed by every presentation and, for that 
matter, not of the order of presentation. In this latter sense, Heidegger 
criticises the notion of presence and presentation. If we follow this latter 
trace in Heidegger’s account of truth, one could argue that Badiou’s no-
tion of subtraction is not simply a break with Heidegger’s account of 
truth as presentation, but is at the same time a furthering of Heidegger’s 
critique of metaphysics. This is also argued by Calcagno when he notes 
that Badiou’s critique of presence remains “faithful to Heidegger’s in-
sights about the tradition of Western philosophy as a metaphysics of 
presence.”
 As a condition of 
possibility of this light, Lichtung is not presentation itself, let alone the 
scintillation that marks evidence.  
This Heideggerian difference returns in Nancy’s work. To intro-
duce his comments on the relation between event and scintillation in Le 
Sens du monde, Nancy inquires into a realm that opens up the possibility 
of presentation and phenomenality and that is itself not of the order of 
presentation. This inquiry is clearly indebted to Heidegger’s concern re-
garding any form of evidence. In fact, Nancy plays with the difference 
between “obvie” and “ob-vie,” but, as he notes, “obvie” is a synonym of 
“évident” in the French. Hence, not only on the level of his explanation 
but also on the level of the examples he chooses, Nancy emphasises the 
similarity between the difference he broaches and Heidegger’s difference 
between evidentia and Lichtung. (SdM 32)  
7
                                                   
6 Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, GA 14 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2007), 80–
3. 
7 Antonio Calcagno, Badiou and Derrida: Politics, Events and their Time (London: 
Continuum, 2007), 94. 
 Hence, Badiou’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth as 
presentation could be described as a critique of presence that is more 
radical than the one Heidegger undertakes. Moreover, read in this way, 
Badiou’s concerns regarding Heidegger are similar to the concerns that 
speak from Nancy’s critical comments on Heidegger’s conception of 
truth as presentation. (SdM 31–4) (Obviously, this critique is to be dis-
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tinguished from Nancy’s affinity with Heidegger’s inquiry into a realm 
that precedes presentation and that is not of the order of presentation.)  
However, at the same time—and this really complicates mat-
ters—Nancy’s critique of the primacy of presentation in Heidegger’s no-
tion of truth is a prelude to his critique of Badiou’s phenomenology of 
the event in Le Sens du monde. Apparently, Nancy considers the problem 
of the interpretation of aletheia as presentation to be akin with the impor-
tant motive of scintillation in contemporary accounts of the event. (SdM 
31–6)  
Let me deduce one, clear description of the question that Nancy 
poses to Badiou’s work from this complicated mix of mutual criticisms. 
Badiou’s ontology of subtraction is a criticism of presence, much like 
and more radical than Heidegger’s critique of Western thought as a 
metaphysics of presence, but is this still true for his phenomenology of 
the event? Does he reintroduce a primacy of presence and presentation in 
his account of the event as Nancy fears? And what does this mean? To 
approach these questions, I first turn to a reading of L’être et 
l’événement, where I concentrate on the relation between Badiou’s ac-
count of subtraction and his account of the existence (and appearance) of 
the event. This important analysis also allows me to discuss the context 
of the passage of Conditions that Nancy relates to in Le Sens du monde.  
   
2. Subtraction and Existence of the Event 
 
One of the fundamental notions that Badiou develops in L’être et 
l’événement is the notion of the subject. In fact, one could argue that 
Badiou’s “powerful dualism”8
                                                   
8 Étienne Balibar, “‘The History of Truth’: Alain Badiou in French Philosophy” in 
Radical Philosophy, 115, 2002, 26. 
 between being and event is developed first 
and foremost to be able to describe the duality (or the Two) that consti-
tutes the subject. (EE 431) As is well-known, the notion of the event 
transgresses the realm of ontology in Badiou’s thought since it does not 
respect the ontological law that states that a set cannot be an element of 
itself. The subject is a Two since, on the one hand, it arises in the wake 
of an event, and, on the other hand, its fidelity to an event consists in a 
specific operation that relates elements from the situation to the event. 
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Let me briefly describe both the ontological and the evental dimension of 
the subject.  
The subjective procedure of fidelity consists in altering the situa-
tion. As such, it can be studied ontologically: there is a being of truth. To 
account for this being of truth and this alteration of the situation, Badiou 
introduces the mathematical notion of a generic set. Loosely speaking, a 
generic set is a subset of a situation that cannot be described in the lan-
guage of the situation. From this mathematical-ontological point of view, 
the procedure of truth can be described globally as the construction of an 
extension of the situation such that the generic set, which need not be an 
element of the original situation, is indeed an element of this extension. 
Consequently, the generic set of truth exists in the (extended) situation, 
although it cannot be described in the language of the (original) situation. 
The notion “the language of the situation” is broached here because it is a 
crucial ingredient in Badiou’s definition of subtraction: each of the four 
forms of subtraction that Badiou distinguishes is defined in relation to 
the language of the situation: subtraction concerns something that cannot 
be decided, discerned, constructed, or named in terms of the language of 
the situation. (C 179–95)  
From this ontological perspective, the difference between the 
perspective of the subject and of the ontologist is the difference between 
a local, finite procedure in which the extension of the situation is realised 
step by step, and the global, infinite result of this procedure in which the 
set of truth eventually exists. (EE 430–1) Being local means here that the 
subject cannot overlook this infinite result.  
However, this ontological point of view is not the only perspec-
tive. In particular, the subject is not only the local procedure of truth, but 
is also faithful to the event. To this evental dimension of the subject cor-
responds a properly subjective dimension of language, namely, nomina-
tion. Badiou uses this term to describe both the nomination of the event 
and the subjective operation of connection. In both cases, the crucial di-
mension of nomination is the invention of names such that these names 
do not refer to elements in the situation as the meaningful language of the 
situation does. Rather, in the case of the operation of connection, the in-
vented names anticipate referents of the extended situation (EE 416–8), 
and in the case of the nomination of the event, the invented name deter-
mines both the appearance and the existence of the event. Hence al-
though the generic set of truth as well as the event are subtracted from 
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the language of the situation, they appear and are brought to existence in 
nomination.  
This double role of language, i.e., as language of the situation 
and as nomination, provides us with the background for Badiou’s cri-
tique of hermeneutics in “L’écriture du générique: Samuel Beckett” (C 
329–66), which is also the passage discussed by Nancy. In this essay, 
Badiou makes distinction between interpretation and nomination. The 
goal of (hermeneutic) interpretation is not to name an event in order to 
mark its transgression of the situation, but to reattach and to reincorpo-
rate the event into the “established universe of significations.” (C 349) In 
this sense, interpretation as the basic category of hermeneutics neglects 
and denies the event as a separation from the (language of the) situation. 
Inspired by Beckett’s Ill Seen, Ill Said, Badiou argues that the occurrence 
of the event as such does not mean that “we are under the imperative of 
the discovery of its [the event’s] sense” (C 349), as hermeneutics claims, 
but that this occurrence requires that we name the event. Unlike interpre-
tation, nomination is not a quest for meaning, which reduces the event to 
the situation; rather, nomination seeks to “fix the incident, to preserve in 
language a trace of its separation.” (C 350) As opposed to an interpreta-
tion, a nomination shows the singularity of the event with respect to the 
situation because it lacks signification. (EE 431) A nomination arises 
from the void of the language of the situation. It provides us with a name 
without meaning, and this name “is subtracted from the grey darkness of 
being, ‘while it shines with formal clarity.’” (C 351)9
This latter quote brings up the theme of scintillation and bril-
liance in relation to the event, as discussed by Nancy. It provides us with 
an account of how the problem of nomination is related to the problem of 
the existence and the scintillation of the event: that which does not exist 
in the situation and cannot be described by the language of the situation, 
is brought to existence by nomination. Nomination lets the invisible 
event shine with brilliance. As such, it is nomination that brings the ques-
tion of phenomenology into play in Badiou’s work of the 1980s as can 
also be seen in L’être et l’événement. Here, Badiou writes, “only an in-
terpretative intervention can declare that an event is presented in a situa-
  
                                                   
9 My translation: “un supplément séparable qui […] soustrait au noir gris de l’être, ‘bril-
lant de clarté formelle.’” 
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tion; as … the arrival amidst the visible of the invisible.” (EE 202/181)10
Badiou is aware of this problem, and he tries to solve it by argu-
ing that “the possibility of the intervention must be assigned to the con-
sequences of another event.” (EE 232/209) Hence, the intervention of an 
event is made possible by the consequences of an other, previous event. 
Thus, Badiou tries to secure the primacy of the event over any subjective 
procedure, so that subjectivity can aptly be characterised as drawing the 
event’s consequences. However, this solution is disappointing since it 
leads to an infinite regress: the prior event presupposes an intervention of 
its own, which refers back to another event, and so on. This does not 
really solve the problem of the relation between event and nomination. In 
fact, this problem guided Badiou to the project of Logiques des mondes. 
Already in 2003, Hallward noted that around that time Badiou aimed to 
develop a conception of the existence of the event such that it is not 
“marked by any ontological trace of the subject position of whoever first 
declared it.”
 
Thus, the appearance of the event depends upon its nomination. Nomina-
tion, however, is subjective. This leads to a typical problem in Badiou’s 
conception of the relation between event, its existence and appearance, 
and the subject in L’être et l’événement: if the event requires this subjec-
tive intervention for its existence, how can we combine this with the fact 
that the subject presupposes the event? Badiou responds as follows to 
this question. On the one hand, the event is prior to the intervention: “It 
is certain that the event alone, aleatory figure of non-being, founds the 
possibility of intervention.” On the other hand, “it is just as certain that if 
no intervention puts it into circulation within the situation on the basis of 
an extraction of elements from the site, then, lacking any being … the 
event does not exist.” (EE 231/209) This latter comment explicitly states 
that the existence of the event depends upon the subject. This leads to a 
serious circularity in Badiou’s conception of the event: how can the sub-
ject at once presuppose the event and be constitutive of the existence of 
the event in its nomination?  
11
                                                   
10 In this quote, one should emphasise “intervention” rather than “interpretative”: inter-
pretative is here not meant as reattaching the event to the “established universe of signifi-
cations.” 
11 Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003), 145. 
 This is the task of Logiques des mondes: to think the exis-
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tence and the appearance of the event beyond its dependence on the sub-
ject.  
These latter remarks give us an outline of the development in 
Badiou’s work, but they do not really help to understand Nancy’s com-
ments on the relation between event and scintillation since these are not 
primarily concerned with the subjective trace at work in the event’s ap-
pearance. To capture the core of Nancy’s comments, we need to return to 
the first sentence of the previous paragraph, which approaches the rela-
tion between event and subject in Badiou’s work from the perspective of 
the consequences of an event as the condition of possibility for subjectiv-
ity and consequently also for nomination. This sentence will guide us in 
the next section. 
 
3. The Occurrence and the Consequences of the Event 
 
At the end of his discussion of the problematic relation between the event 
and the subject in L’être et l’événement, Badiou emphasises that his work 
is not so much concerned with the occurrence of an event as with its 
consequences. He writes, “the entire effort lies in following the event’s 
consequences, not in glorifying its occurrence.” (EE 233/211) This dif-
ference between occurrence and consequences indicates that the genuine 
theme of his book is an account of subjectivity and truth; these two no-
tions both depend on the having already happened of the event. At the 
same time, beyond Badiou’s concerns, this difference between occur-
rence and consequences corresponds to two different perspectives on the 
event. This section is devoted to a brief account of the difference be-
tween these two perspectives.  
On the one hand, one can inquire into the occurrence of an event. 
In this way, one approaches an event as an opening and as a coming to 
presence of something that is completely incongruent to a given situa-
tion. In this mode of questioning, one inquires into the very passage of 
the transition that an event is. On the other hand, one can also inquire 
into the realm of the consequences that is opened up thanks to the occur-
rence of an event. This means that once this event has happened, it has 
opened up the possibility of subjectivity (in Badiou’s sense of the term). 
For Badiou, the passage enacted in the occurrence of the event is impor-
tant, but only insofar as it allows us to think the consequences of the 
event. However, one may wonder whether such an account that insists on 
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the primacy of consequences is capable of doing justice to the event as 
occurrence. This is the question, as I propose to show, that Nancy poses 
to Badiou’s work. 
To approach the event in its occurrence amounts to an inquiry 
into the coming into presence and into the transition from absence to 
presence that characterises the event. Such a transition from a lack of 
manifestation to manifestation is itself neither of the order of presence 
nor of the order of absence. It is this typical intermediate status of the 
event’s occurrence as passage and transition that Nancy brings to the fore 
in Le Sens du monde as an alternative to a conception of the event from 
the perspective of its scintillation. Nancy determines this alternative con-
ception of the event as “sense.”12
                                                   
12 This points to another typical difference between Nancy and Badiou. While they are 
both critical of the hermeneutical paradigm, Badiou dismisses this paradigm as we saw 
above in his reading of Beckett. Nancy, however, does not only try to rethink crucial 
hermeneutical notions such as “world” and “sense,” as he does in Le Sens du monde, but 
he  also tries to rethink the meaning of hermeneutics itself, as can be seen from his work 
on the Greek notion of “hermēneuein” in Le Partage des voix (Paris: Galilée, 1982).  
 Sense, of course, is here not meant in a 
Badiouan sense as reattaching the event to the “established universe of 
significations,” that is, to that which is already present in the situation. It 
is rather meant as the occurrence of the event itself. As Nancy writes, 
“Sense, for its part, is the movement of being-toward, or being as coming 
into presence or again as transitivity, as passage to presence—and 
therewith as passage of presence. Coming does not arise out of presenta-
tion any more, indeed, than it arises out of non-presentation.” (SdM 
25/12) In this quotation, Nancy proposes a crucial difference between, on 
the one hand, presentation and manifestation as the crucial ingredients of 
every phenomenality and, on the other hand, a coming into presence that 
is presupposed by phenomenology. (“This coming [venue] is infinitely 
presupposed.” (SdM 34/17)) In this way, every phenomenon presupposes 
in itself something that transgresses its own phenomenality, namely, the 
very passage that allows a phenomenon to come to presence. As a conse-
quence, Nancy’s comments imply that a conception of the event to which 
“some value of scintillating phenomenality remains invincibly attached” 
(SdM 35/18) forgets to think the event’s occurrence as passage and as 
coming since these dimensions of the event transgress the phenomenality 
of the phenomenon.  
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Of course, in a general sense, although Badiou emphasises that 
he is interested first and foremost in the consequences of the event, the 
event as transition is important for him too. For instance, our brief dis-
cussion of his reading of Beckett has demonstrated that the event and its 
nomination allows the ill seen to shine brilliantly. Hence, the event in-
volves a transition from invisible to brilliance—and as we shall see this 
motive of transition returns in Logiques des mondes with respect to the 
inexistant. However, this does not yet mean that Badiou discusses the 
event as and in its occurrence. In fact, in other contexts he has clearly 
expressed his doubts concerning the category of the to-come to which 
not only Nancy but also Derrida and Heidegger often refer.13 According 
to Badiou, this category does not amount to a genuinely philosophical al-
ternative for classical metaphysics. In relation to Heidegger’s work, 
Badiou even qualifies this insistence on the to-come as being poetic and 
prophetic rather than philosophical; as he writes, “the established power 
of an unknown master [i.e., the highest being in classical metaphysics; 
my note] is opposed by the poetics or prophetics of the to-come.”14
The difference between these two approaches of the event also 
corresponds to a difference between two temporalities. An account from 
the perspective of temporality shows the difference between Nancy and 
Badiou even more clearly. In an interview on Badiou’s reassessment of 
the figure of Saint Paul, Slavoj Žižek touches upon these two different 
temporalities in relation to the  Messiah-event in Christianity and Juda-
ism, respectively. According to him, the occurrence of the Messiah in 
Christianity implies that “it’s done, the Messiah is here.… [This] means 
that the space is now open for struggle. It’s this nice paradox that the fact 
that the big thing happened does not mean it’s over.… [This is] to the 
horror of some of my Jewish friends, who don’t like this idea that in 
Christianity everything happened whereas in Judaism the Messiah is al-
ways postponed, always to-come, and so on.”
  
15
                                                   
13 In a passage on this Heideggerian “a-venir interminable” in the work of Nancy, Badiou 
“malignantly” remarks “on a envie de dire: ‘Écoutez, si cette pensée est encore tout en-
tière à venir, revenez nous voir quand au moins un morceau en sera venu!’” Alain 
Badiou, “L’offrande réservée” in Sens en tous sens : Autour des travaux de Jean-Luc 
Nancy, eds. F. Guibal and J.-C. Martin (Paris: Galilée, 2004), 16. 
14 Badiou, “Metaphysics and the Critique of Metaphysics”, 181. 
15 J. Delpech-Ramey, “An Interview with Slavoj Žižek: ‘On Divine Self-Limitation and 
Revolutionary Love’” in Journal of Philosophy and Scripture 1, 2004, 35. 
 The two temporalities of 
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the Messiah-event that Žižek invokes here are the temporalities of an 
event’s occurrence and of an event’s consequences, respectively.  
Under the name of Judaism, Žižek introduces the time of the oc-
currence of the event. This time is the time of the to-come. In its German 
form Zukunft, this temporal dimension of the event as to-come plays a 
crucial role in the thought of Heidegger. For the early Heidegger, this to-
come character of an event plays a crucial role in his interpretation of 
Saint Paul’s account of the experience of Christian life.16 For Heidegger, 
Christianity is not marked by the fact that everything has already hap-
pened, but by the expectation of the parousia.17 This expectation is an 
expectation of “the reappearance of the once appeared Messiah.”18
Beyond the scope of Heidegger’s understanding of Christian life, 
this early analysis of the Christian hope is similar to the temporal dimen-
sion of Heidegger’s extremely difficult notion of Ereignis. This appro-
priating event—whether it concerns the appropriation of the Greek origin 
of philosophy or the name of being—is marked by a temporal primacy of 
the future that holds something unforeseeable in store for us and that has 
not yet arrived but is still to come and is still drawing near. Even the 
Greek origin of philosophy that Heidegger seeks to bring to language is 
not something that has already happened, but something that still awaits 
us.
 Thus, 
this experience is focused on the coming and the coming into presence.  
19
                                                   
16 Hence, it remains to be seen whether or not Žižek is accurate in ascribing this time of 
the to-come solely to Judaism. 
17 Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, GA 60 (Frankfurt: Klos-
termann, 1995), 98–110. 
18 Ibid., 102. 
19 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La Fiction du politique: Heidegger, l’art et la politique 
(Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1987), 90–1. 
 This primacy of the to-come plays a crucial role in Nancy’s account 
of the temporality of the event and the instant as well. He does not inter-
pret the time of the event as a form of temporizing, that is, as an endless 
delay of the arrival of presence. Such an endless delay would presuppose 
the primacy or the teleology of the arrival of presence. Inspired by Der-
rida, he rather interprets the time of the event as différance. As such, this 
time is, as Nancy writes, the “interior spacing of the very line of time: 
that which distances from one another the two edges of this line, which, 
however, has no thickness whatsoever, in accordance with the coming of 
being, the coming of a singularity, of an ‘instant.’” (SdM 59/35) This 
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distancing within time itself implies, as Nancy continues, that the “com-
ing into presence of being takes place precisely as non-arrival of pres-
ence.” Thus, the event occurs only as non-arrival of presence. Hence, 
also from the perspective of its temporality, it follows that the event can 
only be described before or beyond the scintillation that marks every ar-
rival of presence.  
Under the name of Christianity, Žižek discusses the other ap-
proach of the event: the event’s having already happened opens up “the 
space for struggle.” In this brief but very clear characterisation, Žižek has 
beautifully captured Badiou’s point of view. The emphasis on the having 
already occurred of the event should not be read as prioritizing the past. 
Its having happened does not imply that we can record the event into the 
book of history and carry on with our daily affairs as if nothing hap-
pened, but it opens up the realm of the event’s consequences and as such, 
approached from the perspective of its consequences, the event opens up 
the temporal dimension of the present of the subject. This present is 
marked by the urgency to draw the consequences of the event.  
It is this sense of the present that gains all weight in Badiou’s ac-
count of the Two of the subject and of the consequences of the event. 
Note that, since the subject cannot overlook (as the ontologist can) the 
infinite extension of the situation, there is a version of the unforeseeable 
in Badiou’s thought. However, this version of the unforeseeable concerns 
the extension of the situation in the wake of the event rather than the 
event itself. Moreover, it concerns the way this extension is (not) given 
to the subject. For the ontologist, the infinity of the procedure of truth is, 
with respect to the finite subject as its local support, merely a form of 
temporizing. Yet, the subject’s time is not a temporizing; it is not an end-
less deferral. The time of the subject is the present in which conse-
quences are drawn. In this sense, Badiou is not so much interested in the 
time of the occurrence of the event, but in a “discipline of time” (EE 
233/211), which is a time of the disciples of the event that faithfully fol-
low its consequences.  
 
4. Badiou’s Phenomenology of the Event 
 
What are the implications of the difference between a description of the 
event from the perspective of its occurrence and from the perspective of 
its consequences for Badiou’s phenomenology? This question guides us 
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in this final section where we turn to Badiou’s phenomenology of the 
event developed in Logiques des mondes. As I noted above, Logiques des 
mondes solves the problems of L’être et l’événement concerning the rela-
tion between the event and the subject. In particular, it provides an ac-
count of the existence and the appearance of the event that does not in-
voke the subjective intervention of nomination. To follow Badiou in his 
formal account of the existence and the appearance of the event, let me 
briefly recall some crucial ingredients.  
Book II of Logiques des mondes is devoted to a technical study 
of the transcendental T of a world m. A transcendental is a partially or-
dered set with a minimum element μ and a maximum element M. (LM 
171–84) In the rest of this book, this transcendental plays the formal role 
of degrees of appearance. The notion of the world replaces the notion of 
the situation. Another crucial notion is the object, which Badiou defines 
as a pair (A, Id), where A is an element of the world m, and Id is an ap-
pearance function Id: A x A → T, which determines the degrees of iden-
tity and difference between elements of A. The formal notion of exis-
tence is defined in terms of appearance. Existence is a function E: A → 
T, given by E(a):= Id(a, a) for every element a in A. (LM 260–1)  
With this basic terminology, Badiou introduces a thorough ac-
count of that which he in Conditions described as “the brilliance of that 
which is held in poor esteem.” To see how he does this, we need to recall 
one basic result concerning every object from Book IV. Here, Badiou 
shows that every object has a special element ØA in A such that its exis-
tence is minimal, i.e., E(ØA) = μ. This element is called an inexistant be-
cause it lacks existence. (LM 360–2)20
                                                   
20 The notation Badiou uses for the inexistant (ØA) suggests a similarity with the notion 
of the void (Ø), which he developed in L’être et l’événement, nevertheless they are dif-
ferent. As Badiou remarks, the void is a global, ontological notion: the existence of the 
void is the only existential axiom in set theory. The inexistant, however, is only a local, 
logical notion: it is relative with respect to the object (A, Id). To spell it out: the inexis-
tant is an element of the set A (hence it is relative to A) having minimal existence (hence 
it is relative to the identity function). To borrow Heidegger’s distinction between being 
and beings, as Badiou does, the void “is being as non-being” (LM 361–2), whereas the 
inexistant is a being, although a non-existing one.  
 With this fact in mind, Badiou 
gives a very clear and univocal conception of the transition brought about 
by an event. Note that this transition is not the transition of the event it-
self, but the transition of the inexistant. An event implies that the exis-
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tence of the inexistant changes from minimal to maximal existence, from 
μ to M. Thus, an event allows “that which is held in poor esteem” to 
scintillate maximally.  
To account for this transition, Badiou formalises the notion of the 
event in Book V as follows. First, he defines a site. This is an element A 
such that A is an element of itself. (LM 413)21
This latter scintillation is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of subjectivity. Decisions, points, bodies, and drawing consequences can 
only be thought in light of the mark of the transition implied by the 
event. The expression “in light of” is not metaphorical. The sudden 
splendour of the inexistant that used to be without any glory is the first 
guideline for those who ask for the true life of subjectivity, as Badiou 
writes in his beautiful conclusion: “For those who ask for the true life, 
the first philosophical directive is the following: ‘Take care of what is 
being born. Interrogate the scintillations [éclats], probe their past without 
glory.’” (LM 529)
 An event is defined to be 
a site that satisfies two additional conditions that both involve a maximal 
existence (LM 413–7): (1) since A is a site, A itself appears and exists. 
An event should satisfy the condition that A exists maximally, i.e., E(A) 
= M. Hence, an event involves a scintillating site; (2) the radical change 
implied by the event concerning the existence of the inexistant is simply 
included in the second condition of the definition of an event, which 
reads formally as: E(A) = M → E(ØA) = M. This means that the maximal 
existence of A implies the maximal existence of the inexistant. In turn, 
this transition marks the event. This is why Badiou calls the scintillating 
inexistant the trace of the event.  
22
It is clear that this phenomenology of the event is very well 
suited to account formally for the possibility of a subjectivised body. In 
this sense, Badiou’s account of the consequences of the event in 
Logiques des mondes is highly impressive. Moreover, Badiou also incor-
porates a conception of the transition brought about by the event in his 
account of the scintillation of the inexistant. Yet, this does not enable us 
  
                                                   
21 Note the typical difference with L’être et l’événement; in this book, it is only the event 
that transgresses the ontological law that a set cannot belong to itself. In Logiques des 
mondes, already a site transgresses this law. 
22 My translation: “La première directive philosophique à qui demande où est la vraie vie 
est donc la suivante: ‘Prends soin de ce qui naît. Interroge les éclats, sonde leur passé 
sans gloire.’” 
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to approach the very passage that occurs in the occurrence of an event 
itself. The change concerning the inexistant marks the event. However, 
the event itself is already determined by maximal existence, as we can 
read from the first condition: E(A) = M. Rather than accounting for the 
coming into presence that precedes the appearance and the existence of 
both the event and its results, Badiou’s definition of the event departs 
from the scintillation of the event and approaches the event from the out-
set as a site that appears maximally. With respect to the inquiry to which 
Nancy invites us, namely, an inquiry into the temporality and the (be-
yond-)phenomenality of the coming into presence of the event’s occur-
rence, one would have to conclude—to put it as clearly as possible—that 
such an inquiry is formally obstructed by the equation E(A) = M. This 
equation situates us always already after the arrival of the event rather 
than placing us in the midst of its evental passage. Moreover, it equates 
the event with its scintillation, and as such it deprives us of the possibil-
ity to question into the evental passage, which as passage is not of the 
order of a scintillating presence.   
Along these lines of thought, Nancy’s brief comments from 1993 
are still relevant with respect to the phenomenology of Logiques des 
mondes. Badiou’s formal account of the event  “misses the excess or the 
initial spacing” (SdM 35/18) of this occurrence. Without a doubt, 
Badiou’s ontology of subtraction in L’être et l’événement is an impres-
sive break with any metaphysics of presence. But what about his phe-
nomenology of the event? The critique of metaphysics as it has been de-
veloped by Derrida and adopted and furthered by Nancy is in the first 
place a critique of the notion of presence in phenomenology in order to 
account for that which is presupposed in every phenomenon and which 
transcends the phenomenality of the phenomenon. Of course, Badiou’s 
questions with regard to Heidegger’s account of the to-come need to be 
addressed, namely, what does it mean that Heidegger’s interpretation of 
the to-come remains to some extent indebted to a poetic and a prophetic 
discourse?—and need to be extended to, for instance, Derrida’s and 
Nancy’s discussion of the to-come. At the same time, the phenomenon of 
the event cannot be discussed without taking its occurrence and its pas-
sage into account. At this point, Nancy’s work on the time of the instant 
as well as his efforts to think the occurrence of the event as a non-
scintillation and a non-arrival of presence provide us with important 
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critical questions concerning maximal appearance and existence in 
Badiou’s definition of the event. 
By posing these mutual questions, the phenomenon of the event 
“comes to meet us” in its different dimensions, its occurrence as well as 
its consequences. Thus, these mutual questions “open the path” (SdM 
32/17) to the phenomenon of the event; that is to say, these dimensions 
become “obvie,” obvious, evident, and visible as the dimensions that any 
account of the event needs to address. 
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